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Abstract 
This paper* develops a social unrest measure by revising Esteban-Ray (1994, 
Econometrica) polarization index. For the purpose of measuring more effectively the level of 
social unrest that is generated by separation of income classes, the new index allows for 
asymmetry between the rich and the poor groups’ alienation feeling against the other, and it 
constructs a more effective group identification function. To facilitate statistical inferences, 
asymptotic distribution of the proposed measure is also derived using results from U-statistics, 
and an easy-to-implement jackknife-based variance estimation algorithm is obtained. Since the 
new index is general enough to include the Esteban-Ray index and the Gini index for group data 
as special cases, the asymptotic results can be readily applied to these popular indices. Evidence 
based on the Panel Study of Income Dynamics data suggests that the level of social unrest has 
generally increased over the sample period of 1981-2005, particular since the late 1990’s, and the 
increase is statistically significant.  
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1 Introduction
In development economics, the sizable private and social costs of political instability gener-
ated by conflicts between subgroups of a society have been regarded as a major constraint to
economic growth and human development (e.g., Collier, 1999; Fearon and Laitin, 2003). In
general, measuring the level of social unrest is of interest in social science since it is related
with crime, collective action, riot, social conflict, or civil war (e.g., D’Ambrosio and Wolﬀ,
2001; Reynal-Querol, 2002).
However, studies on developing the measures of social unrest level are somewhat limited
except the polarization index by Esteban and Ray (1994).1 Esteban and Ray (1994, p.820)
writes,
“ . . . why are we interested in polarization? . . . the phenomenon of polarization
is closely linked to the generation of tensions, to the possibilities of articulated
rebellion and revolt, and to the existence of social unrest in general.”
As emphasized by Esteban and Ray (1994) and Wolfson (1994), polarization is conceptually dif-
ferent from inequality: The latter describes overall dispersion of income distribution, whereas
the former emphasizes the within-group clustering as well as the distance between diﬀerent
income groups so that it can describe phenomena of the disappearing middle class and for-
mation of two segregated income classes. As such, polarization indices serve as a measure of
between-group conflicts, and Esteban and Ray (1999) try to identify the type of distributions
under which social conflict is most likely. There has been more studies on the measures of
[bi]polarization of income distribution (e.g., Wolfson, 1994; Esteban and Ray, 1999; Duclos,
Esteban and Ray, 2004; Esteban, Gradin, and Ray, 2007; Foster and Wolfson, 2010) but none
of them focus on the level of social unrest.
This paper contributes to the existing literature in two-fold: It develops a generalized
polarization index that measures the level of social unrest that is generated by separation of
income classes more eﬀectively than existing indices; and it analytically provides a basis for
1The measure of segregation by Hutchens (2004) is related.
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statistical inference of the new index. First, we extend the Esteban-Ray polarization index by
allowing asymmetry between the rich and the poor groups’ alienation feeling against the other,
and by constructing a more eﬀective group identification function relative to existing indices.
When we consider the total antagonism all individuals have in a society, it is natural to believe
that, for a given statistical properties of income distribution, the poor feel a greater extent of
alienation against the rich than vice versa. In addition, for a sensible representation of the
degree of group-specific identity, which is the key element that distinguishes the concept of
polarization from that of inequality, we consider not only the group size but also the degree of
group-specific income clustering in the group identification function:2 A person feels stronger
group identity to his own group either when the size of own group is larger or when within-
group income distribution is less dispersed. The current measure is general enough to include
the Esteban-Ray index and the Gini index for group data as special cases.
Second, despite repeated reports in the empirical research that income distribution became
more (or less) [bi]polarized between two time points (e.g., Gradin, 2000; Gradin and Rossi,
2006; Esteban, Gradin, and Ray, 2007; Hussain, 2009), few studies provide formal statistical
conclusions because there is little study on the theoretical distributions of those indices. To
facilitate statistical inferences, we derive the asymptotic distribution of the proposed measure
using results from U-statistics, which generalizes Bishop, Formby and Zheng (1997). This re-
sult is quite useful since it can be naturally extended to existing Esteban-Ray type polarization
indices and the Gini index for grouped data. Understanding that estimation of the asymp-
totic variance can be tedious, we also propose an easy-to-implement jackknife-based variance
estimation algorithm.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops a social unrest
measure that represents the total eﬀective antagonism in a society. Section 3 develops the
asymptotic distribution of the new measure. As a special case, Section 4 deals with the
polarization into two groups (i.e., bipolarization) along with jackknife estimation strategy of
the asymptotic variance. As an illustration, Section 5 obtains the trajectory of the social unrest
2 In contrast, Esteban and Rey (1994) consider only the group size eﬀect in designing the group identification
function. Esteban, Gradin, and Ray (2007) do not consider group-specific clustering eﬀects but sum of all group
clustering eﬀects as a whole in extending Esteban and Ray’s (1994) index.
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level in the U.S. using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics data and compares them before
and after adjusting government taxes and transfers. Section 6 concludes the paper with some
remarks. All technical proofs are collected in the Appendix.
2 Measuring the Level of Social Unrest
We assume that a set of individual income data {}=1 is a random sample from an underlying
distribution  (), whose support is given by [min max] with 0  min  max  ∞. We
consider  number of pre-specified income groups {}=1, where  = (−1 ] for  =
1 2 · · ·  and 2 ≤   . Without loss of generality, we let min = 0  1  · · ·  −1 
 = max and define the first interval [0 1] to be closed. The number of intervals, , is
given and it is assumed to be fixed (i.e., not growing with ) and small (e.g.,  = 2 for the
case of bipolarization, i.e., polarization into two groups). For each group , we define the
population fraction  and the group mean  as
 =
Z 
−1
 () and  = 1
Z 
−1
 () ,
where we assume that   0 for all . It follows that P=1  = 1 and the overall mean is
given as  = R  () = P=1 . Note that the group means are in ascending order by
construction so that    if   .
We measure the level of social unrest by
P ( ) = 1
2
X
=1
X
=1 () ( − ) (1)
for some constants  and  (to be discussed subsequently) that are chosen by the researcher.
()  0 represents the within-group identity measure of group  and  () = 2 ( − I {  0})
represents the between-group alienation measure that depends on the mean income distance
between diﬀerent income groups, where I{·} is the binary indicator. Similar to Esteban and
Ray (1994), therefore, P ( ) combines the following two concepts: within-group identity and
between-group alienation. Recall that the polarization index developed by Esteban and Ray
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Figure 1:  ( − ) describes asymmetric alienations of group  towards 
(1994) is defined as  () = (1)P=1P=1 1+  | − |.
To be more specific, we formulate between-group alienation as
 ( − ) = 2 ( − ) ( − I {  }) , (2)
which is more general than  () in the sense that we allow for asymmetric feelings of
alienation,3 with the degree of the asymmetry being determined by the value . Specifically, if
we let 0 ≤  ≤ 12, then the lower income groups feel more alienated from the higher income
groups than vice versa. The asymmetry gets more severe as  goes to zero. As an extreme
case, if  = 0 then the richer groups do not feel any alienation against the poorer groups (e.g.,
Yitzhaki, 1979). If  = 12 then the degree of alienation is symmetric between the groups,
which corresponds to the case of  () and the standard income inequality measures like the
Gini index.
Therefore, the polarization index P ( ) reflects not only the between-group income dis-
tance (i.e., the economical aspect of the alienation) but also the asymmetric degree of feelings
that each group has against the others (i.e., psychological aspect of the alienation). Figure 1
3For the asymmetry, Esteban and Ray (1994) briefly mentioned about such generalization but there has
been no studies in that extension.
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depicts ( − ), where the absolute value of the slope determines the degree of the asym-
metric alienation of group  towards diﬀerent income-level groups.4 Note that the parameter of
asymmetric feeling of alienation, , is diﬀerent from the inequality aversion parameter in Atkin-
son’s index (Atkinson, 1970) or generalized entropy index (Cowell and Kuga, 1981; Shorrocks,
1984); the latter measures the overall (and thus symmetric) inequality aversion level whereas
the former measures the asymmetric inequality aversion levels in each direction.
For a more eﬀective representation of within-group identity, we assume that the degree of
group-identity is positively aﬀected by the group size but is inversely related to within-group
income dispersion. More precisely, for   0, we let
() =
µ

¶
(3)
for some within-group income dispersion measure   0 over the interval .5 Similarly as
Lee and Shin (2012), we consider the relative dispersion measure (e.g.,  or , where
 and  are the standard deviation and the Gini index of the entire population) instead of the
absolute dispersion measure (i.e.,  or ). For example, changes in  also alter the overall
income inequality level  so that it aﬀects other groups’ relative dispersion (i.e., other things
being constant, as  decreases, members in other groups feel relatively less identified). In
particular, we let
 =  (4)
in this paper. In this specification, within-group identity gets larger either when the population
share of group  increases or when the dispersion of the within-group income distribution of
group  decreases. In comparison, the standard polarization index by Esteban and Ray (1994)
4The parameter  represents the psychological degree of alienation of (poorer) group  toward (richer) group
 for all  and ; the reversed direction is represented by 1 − . In general, however, this parameter could be
heterogeneous across diﬀerent pairs of groups ( ), depending on the relative location of , the distance between
 and  and the sign of ( − ). But we simply assume the homogeneous case in this paper to minimize the
number of parameters in the index.
5As stated in Esteban and Ray (1994),  is a parameter that distinguishes Esteban-Ray type polarization
measures from an inequality measure. 0   ≤ 16 needs to be satisfied to meet the axioms of Esteban-Ray
polarization concept.
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assumes  = 1 for all .6 An individual feels the income class separation more as a social
structural problem when the population proportion  of some particular income groups get
larger. The income dispersion of group  reflects the degree of feeling on individuals’ income
level clustering in group , and an individual identifies more with her group members as
within-group income levels become more similar.
Note that the polarization index P ( ) is general enough to cover the existing inequality
or income polarization indices. For example, if  = 12 (and thus  () = ||) and () =  ,
then the polarization index P ( ) in (1) becomes the index developed by Esteban and Ray
(1994),  (). Furthermore, if  = 12 and () = 1, then the index becomes the Gini index
for grouped data. However, P ( ) represents the level of social unrest, which is implied by
income distribution, more eﬀectively than these indices, since it allows not only for asymmetric
degrees of alienation among diﬀerent income groups but also for a more plausible identification
function explaining the within-group clustering.
Remark Though the number of groups  is arbitrarily chosen in defining the social unrest
measure P ( ), we need to properly choose the cutoﬀ points 1 · · ·  −1. In general, such
a problem is solved using the -means clustering algorithm (e.g., Hartigan and Wong, 1979)
for a given number of groups. Esteban, Gradin and Ray (2007) employ Aghevli and Mehran
(1981)’s method of optimal grouping for a given . The idea is that one minimizes the sum of
within-group income dispersions (e.g., the mean diﬀerence) with respect to the optimal cutoﬀ
points. Geometrically, this method corresponds to approximating the continuous Lorenz curve
by piecewise linear functions and finding the optimal cutoﬀ points that minimize the overall
approximation error. Aghevli and Mehran (1981) show that the optimal cutoﬀ point is the
6 In  (),  measures the feeling of identification each individual has toward her own group members. In
comparison, our new polarization index P ( ) considers not only the ‘size eﬀect’ () but also the ‘clustering
eﬀect’ (1) in measuring the degree of within-group identity. In this regards, it can be understood that
the extended polarization index by Esteban, Gradin and Ray (2007) also considers the group clustering eﬀect
implicitly, though such a point is not discussed in their paper. Note that their extended index is defined as
 ( ) =  () −  , where ( 0) is some arbitrary weight parameter (often  = 1) and  is
the error in approximating the continuous Lorenz curve by -piecewise linear functions.  gets smaller as
within-group income distributions become more clustered around their group means. In this aspect, we can
understand that P ( ) constructs the identity function of each group using its own clustering eﬀect whereas
 ( ) combines all the clustering eﬀects to consider the overall approximation.
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population mean in the case of two groups.
3 Asymptotic Distribution
From (2), (3) and (4), we can readily obtain an estimator for P ( ) in (1) using proper
estimators for   and  ( = 1 2 · · · ) as
bP ( ) = 1
2
X
=1
X
=1 bb
Ã bb b
!
 ( − ) , (5)
where
b =  = 1X=1 I { ∈ } ,  = 1 X=1 I { ∈ }
and  = (1)P=1  with  being the number of observations in the interval . Recall
that b = ¡1(22)¢P=1P=1 | −  | I { ∈ } I { ∈ } is the Gini coeﬃcient for
group  and b = ¡1(22)¢P=1P=1 | −  | is the standard Gini coeﬃcient. Since the
number of groups is fixed as  and independent of , we can assume that  →∞ for each 
as →∞ without loss of generality. Therefore, for given ( ), the consistency of bP ( ) to
P ( ) readily follows by applying the continuous mapping theorem, since all the components
in (5) are consistent to their population counterparts.
Despite the repeated reports that income distribution has become more bipolarized, few
studies provide formal statistical conclusions since the asymptotic distribution results of those
polarization indices are not well established. This section derives the asymptotic distribution
of the generalized index estimator bP ( ) to facilitate further (distribution-free) statistical
inferences for the index. As discussed above, the new index is general enough to include the
Esteban-Ray type indices as special cases and thus the statistical results below can be directly
applied to those indices.
We let b = −2P=1P=1 | −  | be the standard mean diﬀerence coeﬃcient and b =b = −1 −1 P=1P=1 | −  | I { ∈ } I { ∈ } be the sub-group mean diﬀerence co-
eﬃcient for all   = 1 2 · · ·. It holds that b = P=1P=1 bbb (e.g., Dagum, 1997)
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and  =P=1 b by construction. Then bP ( ) in (5) can be rewritten as
bP ( ) =
³P
=1
P
=1 bbb´³P
=1 b´1+
×
X
=1 b1+
µ b
¶ n
X b ( − ) + (1− )X b ( − )o
since b = b2 and b = b2 for each . In order to derive the asymptotic distribution
of bP ( ), we introduce the following  -statistics for   = 1 2 · · · :
0 = −1
X
=1 I { ∈ } ,
1 = −1
X
=1 I { ∈ } ,
2 = −2
X
=1
X
=1 | −  | I { ∈ } I { ∈ } ,
that are consistent estimators of 0, 1 and 2, respectively, where
0 =
Z

 () ,
1 =
Z

 () ,
2 =
Z

Z

| − |  ()  () .
Using these  -statistics, since b = 0,  = 10, b = 200 for all   =
1 2 · · · , we can rewrite bP ( ) as
bP ( ) =
³P
=1
P
=1 2
´
³P
=1 1
´1+ X=1 12
n
X ³2001+1 − 1+20 11´
+(1− )X ³1+20 11 − 2001+1 ´o
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that is consistent for (provided 2  0 for all )
P ( ) =
³P
=1
P
=1 2
´
³P
=1 1
´1+ X=1 12
n
X ³2001+1 − 1+20 11´
+(1− )X ³1+20 11 − 2001+1 ´o
as →∞ from the Slutsky’s theorem.
To derive asymptotic distribution of bP ( ), we first need to obtain joint asymptotic
distribution of the vector of  -statistics of 0, 1 and 2 for all   = 1 2 · · · . For the
representation purposes, however, it is suﬃce to obtain joint distribution of the 9×1 vector of  -
statistics U∗ ≡ (0 0 1 1 2 2 2 2 2)0, where  6=  6=  6=  6= .
The following lemma summarizes asymptotic distribution ofU∗ from Theorem 7.1 of Hoeﬀding
(1948). We let υ∗ ≡ (0 0 1 1 2 2 2 2 2)0.
Lemma 1 Let {}=1 be i.i.d. with continuous distribution  () and finite variance. If
   ()  1− for all  = 1 2 · · · −1 and for some  ∈ (0 1), then the joint distribution
of
√(U∗ − υ∗) tends to the 9-variate normal distribution as  → ∞ with zero mean and
covariance matrix Σ∗, which is given by (A.1) in the Appendix.
Note that Bishop, Formby and Zheng (1997) consider the joint distribution of (0 1 2)
for the particular case of  = (0 ] with some   0; Lemma 1 extends their result.
Using Lemma 1 and Theorem 7.5 of Hoeﬀding (1948), we obtain asymptotic distribution
of bP ( ) as follows. We let U ≡ (01 · · ·  0  11 · · ·  1  211 · · ·  2)0 and
υ ≡ (01 · · ·  0  11 · · ·  1  211 · · ·  2)0.
Theorem 2 Under the same conditions as Lemma 1, we have
√( bP ( ) − P ( )) →
N (0 P ( )) as →∞, where P ( ) = [∇P ( )]0Σ[∇P ( )], ∇P ( ) is the (2 +
( + 1)2) × 1 vector of partial derivatives of P ( ) with respect to υ, and Σ is the
(2 +( + 1)2)× (2 +( + 1)2) matrix of asymptotic variance matrix of U whose
elements can be obtained from Σ∗ in Lemma 1. The specific form of ∇P ( ) is given in the
Appendix.
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Distributions of various inequality measures and polarization measure can be obtained from
Theorem 2. For example, for general number of groups, P ( 12) with () =  becomes
the polarization index  () developed by Esteban and Ray (1994);7 P (0 12) becomes the
Gini index for grouped data. Furthermore, when  = 2 (and thus two income groups are
given as [0 ] and (∞) for some constant   0), if we let 01 = −1P=1 I { ≤ },
11 = −1P=1 I { ≤ } and 21 = −2P=1P=1 | −  | I { ≤ } I { ≤ }, we can
also obtain asymptotic distributions of several poverty indices similarly as Bishop, Formby and
Zheng (1997), Xu (2007), and Barrett and Donald (2009).
4 The Case of Bipolarization
In many studies, polarization into two groups (i.e., bipolarization) is considered important
because of the following reasons. First, the income polarization literature starts with the
historical event of the disappearing middle class resulting in formation of two income groups,
which has been observed in many developed countries such as the United States and the United
Kingdom. In fact, another commonly used polarization index by Wolfson (1994) deals only
with the bipolarization case. Second, conceptually speaking, the issue of polarization becomes
less important as the number of groups increases. In extreme, when all individuals in the
population form their own groups, neither group size nor within-group homogeneity matters
in the concept and the measurement of polarization, and only inequality concept remains. As
a special example of the general polarization index, this section focuses on bipolarization (i.e.,
 = 2), for which the closed form expressions are also obtained of the main results in the
previous section.
First note that, when  = 2, P ( ) in (1) can be rewritten as
B ( ) = 2 − 1 12
∙
(1− )
µ 1
1
¶
+ 
µ 2
2
¶¸
7While we consider the case with fixed  but large  asymptotics above, Duclos, Esteban and Ray (2004)
derive the asymptotic properties of () under the large  asymptotics.
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for 1  2 by construction, whose consistent estimator can be obtained as
bB ( ) = µ1− 1
¶b1 b ∙(1− )µ b1b1
¶
+ 
µ
1− b1b2
¶¸
. (6)
Here, we use a new notation B ( ) to highlight that we consider  = 2 case. Similarly as
the previous section, we can rewrite bB ( ) as
bB ( ) = 51 − 24
(2 + 5)1+ (3 + 27 + 6)

½
(1− )
µ221
3
¶
+ 
µ524
6
¶¾
using the  -statistics
1 = −1P=1 I { ≤ ∗}
2 = −1P=1 I { ≤ ∗}
3 = −2P=1P=1 | −  | I { ≤ ∗} I { ≤ ∗}
4 = −1P=1 I {  ∗}
5 = −1P=1 I {  ∗}
6 = −2P=1P=1 | −  | I {  ∗} I {  ∗}
7 = −2P=1P=1 | −  | I {  ∗} I { ≤ ∗} ,
where we consider two income groups [min ∗] and (∗ max] for some cutoﬀ point ∗. Denoting
1 = R ∗−∞  () =  (∗)
2 = R ∗−∞  ()
3 = R ∗−∞ R ∗−∞ | − |  ()  ()
4 = R∞∗  () = 1−  (∗)
5 = R∞∗  ()
6 = R∞∗ R∞∗ | − |  ()  ()
7 = R ∗−∞ R∞∗ | − |  ()  () ,
1 2 · · ·  7 are consistent estimators of 1 2 · · ·  7, respectively. Theorem 7.1 of Hoeﬀd-
ing (1948) gives that the joint distribution of
√( − ) for  = 1 2 · · ·  7 tends to the
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7-variate normal distribution as →∞ with zero mean and covariance matrix ΣB given by
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
1 (1− 1) 2 (1− 1) 23 (1− 1) −14 −15 −16 −17
2 223 −24 −25 −26 −27
43 −34 −35 −36 −37
4 (1− 4) 5 (1− 4) 26 (1− 4) 7 (1− 4)
5 256 27 (1− 5)
46 467
47
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
,
where
2 =
R ∗
−∞ 2 ()− 22
3 =
R ∗
−∞
nR ∗
−∞ | − |  ()
o2  ()− 23
23 =
R ∗
−∞
R ∗
−∞  | − |  ()  ()− 23
5 =
R∞
∗ 2 ()− 25
6 =
R∞
∗
nR∞
∗ | − |  ()
o2  ()− 26
7 =
R∞
∗
nR ∗
−∞( − ) ()
o2  ()− 27
56 =
R∞
∗
R∞
∗  | − |  ()  ()− 56
67 =
R∞
∗
nR∞
∗ | − |  ()
onR ∗
−∞( − ) ()
o
 ()− 67.
Using this result, Theorem 7.5 of Hoeﬀding (1948) gives asymptotic distribution of bB ( )
as follows.
Corollary 3 Let {}=1 be i.i.d. with continuous distribution  () and finite variance. If
   (∗)  1−  for some  ∈ (0 1), we have √( bB ( )− B ( ))→ N (0 B ( )) as
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→∞, where B ( ) = [∇B ( )]0ΣB[∇B ( )] and the 7× 1 vector ∇B ( ) is given by

1+
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
5 + 21 5
−4 − (1 + ) + 2 −4 − (1 + ) 
 − 3 
−2 −2 + 24
1 − (1 + )  1 − (1 + ) + 5
  − 6
2 2
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
⎛
⎜⎝
(1− ) ¡2213¢
 ¡5246¢
⎞
⎟⎠
with  = (2 − 1)12.
In practice, we mostly need to obtain the standard error of bB ( ) for further statistical
inference. For example, when we want to compare the levels of social unrest between two
diﬀerent groups or to test for changes in the level of social unrest over time, the standard error
is a key ingredient for constructing any test statistics. The asymptotic variance B ( ) can be
consistently estimated using the sample counterparts of ’s for  = 1 2 · · ·  7 (i.e., their  -
statistics, 1 2 · · ·  7), but the calculation is quite complicated even for the bipolarization
case as appears in Corollary 3. To facilitate the variance estimation of bB ( ), we propose
a subsampling method, specifically the jackknife variance estimation (e.g., Yitzhaki, 1991;
Karagiannis and Kovacevic, 2000). The procedure is summarized in detail as follows.8
1. We sort the original income data in ascending order and denote them as {}=1; therefore,
the index of  also represents its rank .
(a) We calculate the sample mean  = (1)P=1 .
(b) We define  =P=1  and  =P=+1  for  = 1 2 · · ·   with  = 0.
8Note that bootstrap variance estimation of the Gini coeﬃcient is still computationally demanding especially
when  is large like the conventional income data. This is still the case for B ( ) since we need to calculate
the Gini coeﬃcients  and  in each iteration step. On the other hand, the jackknife variance estimator can
be obtained much faster than the bootstrap variance estimator. In this paper, we use the algorithm suggested
by Karagiannis and Kovacevic (2000). In comparison, Xu (2000) proposes the iterated-bootstrap method for
inference for (generalized) Gini indices.
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(c) Then the Gini coeﬃcient can be obtained as b = (2)  ¡2¢− (+ 1) .
2. We group the data in two using a given cutoﬀ point ∗ (e.g., the sample mean ), and
let 1 = {|  ∗} and 2 = {| ≥ ∗}.
(a) Since the original data is already sorted in step 1, the data in each group is also
properly ordered. For each group  = 1 2, we let  be the number of observations
in group  and {}=1 be the sorted income data in group . We also denote 
as the rank of ’s in group .
(b) We calculate the group sample proportion b =  and the group sample mean
 = (1)P=1 . We also define  =P=1  and  =P=+1  for
 = 1 2 · · ·   with  = 0.
(c) Then the Gini coeﬃcient of group  can be obtained as b = (2)  ¡2¢ −
( + 1) .
(d) Using values obtained in steps 1 and 2, we calculate bB ( ) as in (6) for given 
and .
3. From the entire sample, we omit the -th observation . (We do not change the groups
1 and 2 in Step 2 even after omitting one observation.)
(a) Using (− 1)-number of observations, we obtain the new sample mean and the Gini
coeﬃcient as
(−) = 1− 1 ( − ) and b(−) = 2(−) (− 1)2 (−  −)− − 1 .
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(b) We let
b1(−) =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
(1 − 1)  (− 1) if  ∈ 1
1 (− 1) if  ∈ 2
1(−) =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
(11 − )  (1 − 1) if  ∈ 1
1 if  ∈ 2
2(−) =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
2 if  ∈ 1
(22 − )  (2 − 1) if  ∈ 2
.
Then the Gini coeﬃcients of group 1 and 2 can be obtained as
b1(−) =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
2
1(−)(1−1)2 (1 − 1 −1)−
11−1 if  ∈ 1b1 if  ∈ 2 ,
b2(−) =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
b2 if  ∈ 1
2
2(−)(2−1)2 (2 − 2 −2)−
22−1 if  ∈ 2
.
(c) Using values obtained in step 3 above, we get bB(−) ( ) as
bB(−) ( ) =
Ã
1− 1(−)(−)
!b1(−)
"
(1− )
Ã b1(−)b1(−) b(−)
!
+ 
Ã
1− b1(−)b2(−) b(−)
!#
.
4. We iterate step 3 from  = 1 to  and recursively calculate
 = −1 + − 1
³ bB(−) ( )− bB ( )´2
with 0 = 0. Then,  is the jackknife variance estimate of bB ( ).
5 Empirical Illustration
Using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) data, this section illustrates how the level
of social unrest, as measured by the new index for the case of two income groups, has evolved
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over the survey period from 1981 to 2005. The PSID is a longitudinal survey administered by
the Survey Research Center (SRC) of the University of Michigan every year from 1968 through
1997 and every other year afterwards. We exploit the SRC’s random sample, excluding the
so-called ‘poverty’ sample. Due to unavailability of information on government taxes/transfers,
we exclude the pre-1981 period from the sample. For consistency of the survey frequency, we
exploit surveys only for odd years. (Note that, however, since each year’s survey contains the
total family income for the previous year, our sample period in fact runs every other year from
1980 through 2004.) We analyze two income variables at the family level: the total family
income and the total family income adjusted by government actions. The former is defined
by the sum of family labor earnings, family asset income, family private transfers, and family
private retirement income. The latter is defined by subtracting household taxes from the total
family income and adding public transfer income and social security pensions.
Figures 2 through 4 display how the level of social unrest has evolved over the sample
period for diﬀerent values of . In each figure, the line connecting rectangular data points
shows the level of social unrest represented by the total family income, and the line connecting
circular data points displays the level of social unrest computed by the adjusted family income.
Each series of the social unrest level is accompanied by a pair of dotted lines, which represent
a (pointwise) confidence interval at the 95% level. For all figures,  is set to be 16.9 A value
of  smaller than 05 implies that the poor feel more alienated against the rich than the rich
do against the poor. The degree of this asymmetry gets stronger, as we move from Figures 2
to 4, this is, a greater weight is placed on the poor group.
Several conclusions emerge from comparison of these figures. First, in all cases and for
both income variables, the level of social unrest has generally increased over the sample period,
particular since the late 1990’s. And the change is statistically significant. Second, for both
income variables, as we change the value of  from 05 to 00, so placing a greater weight on the
poor group, there is a tendency of observing a larger increase in the measured level of social
unrest. Third, for each value of , the level of social unrest measured by the adjusted family
income is generally lower than that by the total family income, implying that the government
9The current findings are quite robust with respect to diﬀerent values of  in a qualitative sense.
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Figure 2: Evolution of the Level of Social Unrest: ( ) = (05 16). Data source: Panel Study of
Income Dynamics. The horizontal axis represents survey years. The 95% confidence level is adopted in deriving
(pointwise) confidence intervals.
taxes/transfers program has been generally eﬀective in mitigating the level of social unrest.
(cf. Bishop, Formby and Zheng, 1998) Fourth, as we place a greater weight to the poor group,
the government actions become less eﬀective in reducing the level of social unrest for the late
1980s to 2000 period, not for the other period.
6 Concluding Remarks
For more eﬀective representation of the level of social unrest, existing Esteban-Ray type indices
are revised in a way that the new index allows for asymmetric feeling of alienation between
diﬀerent income groups and includes a more sensible group identification function relative to
existing ones. Furthermore, to facilitate statistical inferences, asymptotic distribution of the
new index is derived using results from U-statistics, and an easy-to-implement jackknife-based
variance estimation algorithm is obtained. The new index is general enough to include the
index by Esteban and Ray (1994) and the Gini index for group data as special cases.
One fundamental feature underlying all existing polarization indices including the new one
developed in this paper is that even the richer groups contribute to the index. In case of
17
Figure 3: Evolution of the Level of Social Unrest: ( ) = (025 16).
Figure 4: Evolution of the Level of Social Unrest: ( ) = (0 16).
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bipolarization, more specifically, either when the between-group income distance gets longer
or when the within-group income distribution becomes less dispersed among the rich, the
level of contribution of the rich toward the index value increases. This feature is based on
the presumption that the rich and the poor are antagonistic against each other. While such
assumption is essential for the purpose of explaining between-group conflicts or ‘collective
crimes’ from the view point of an individual’s economic crime incentive, the rich would feel
less crime incentives as they expect that their life-time income will be more secured following
bipolarization of the current income distribution (e.g., Lee and Shin, 2012; Lee, Shin and Shin,
2013). For a better representation of the level of social unrest, future research could be directed
to further generalize the current index by considering both the collective and the individual
crime incentives simultaneously.
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Appendix: Mathematical Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1 From Theorem 7.1 of Hoeﬀding (1948), the asymptotic variance Σ∗ can
be obtained as
Σ∗ =
⎛
⎜⎝
Σ∗11 Σ∗12
Σ∗012 Σ∗22
⎞
⎟⎠ , (A.1)
where Σ∗11
(4×4)
, Σ∗12
(4×5)
and Σ∗22
(5×5)
are given as


0(1− 0) −00 1(1− 0) −01
0(1− 0) −01 1(1− 0)
1 − 21 −11
1 − 21


,


2(1− 0)2 −202 (1− 20)2 (1− 20)2 −202
−202 22(1− 0) (1− 20)2 −202 −202
2
2 − 12
 −212 2 − 212 2 − 212 −212
−212 2 2 − 12
 2 − 212 −212 −212


,


4
3 − 22
 −422 2 3 − 222

2
3 − 222
 −422
4
3 − 22

2
3 − 222
 −422 −422
3 + 3 − 422 3 − 422 −422
3 + 3 − 422 −422
3 + 3 − 422


,
respectively, with
1 =
R
 2 ()
2 =
R

R
  | − |  ()  ()
3 =
R

nR
 | − |  ()
onR
 | − |  ()
o
 () .
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Though most of the terms are standard, deriving covariance terms involving 2 needs some
care. For example, the leading term of the asymptotic variance of 2 can be obtained fromZ µZ

|− | I { ∈ }  ()− 2
¶2
 ()
+2
Z µZ

|− | I { ∈ }  ()− 2
¶µZ

|− | I { ∈ }  ()− 2
¶
 ()
+
Z µZ

|− | I { ∈ }  ()− 2
¶2
 ()
=
Z

µZ

|− |  ()
¶2
 () +
Z

µZ

|− |  ()
¶2
 ()− 422
since 2 = 2 and R ³R |− | I { ∈ }  ()´³R |− | I { ∈ }  ()´  () =
0 for I { ∈ } I { ∈ } = 0 with  6= . The other terms can be obtained similarly. ¤
Proof of Theorem 2 The result follows directly using Lemma 1 and Theorem 7.5 of Ho-
eﬀding (1948). In this proof, we summarize the elements of ∇P ( ). We first note that
for
(1 · · ·  ) =
X
=1
(
1
X

1(1 2) + 2
X

2(1 2)
)
with continuously diﬀerentiable bivariate functions 1(1 2) and 2(1 2), we have

(1 · · ·  ) =
X

{111(1 2) + 222(1 2)}+
X

{221(1 2) + 112(1 2)}
where (1 2) = (1 2) for  = 1 2. Using this result, for each  =
1 2 · · · , we obtain that
P ( )
0
=
()
2
X

n

h
22−10 01+1 − (1 + 2) 2011
i
+ (1− )
h
1+20 11 − 201+1
io
+
()
2
X

n
(1− )
h
(1 + 2) 2011 − 22−10 01+1
i
+ 
h
201+1 − 1+20 11
io
= ()
Ã201
2
!(

"X

01 ( )−
X

02 ( )
#
+ (1− )
"X

02 ( )−
X

01 ( )
#)
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where () = (P=1P=1 2)(P=1 1)1+, 01 ( ) = 2−1001−(1 + 2) 1
and 02 ( ) = 01 − 1. Similarly, for each  = 1 2 · · · ,
P ( )
1
= −(1 + )P ( )P
=1 1
+
()
2
X

n

h
(1 + ) 2001 − 1+20 −11 1
i
+ (1− )
h
1+20 1
io
+
()
2
X

n
(1− )
h
1+20 −11 1 − (1 + ) 2001
i
+ 
h
−1+20 1
io
= −(1 + )P ( )P
=1 1
+()
Ã201
2
!(

"X

11 ( )−
X

12 ( )
#
+ (1− )
"X

12 ( )−
X

11 ( )
#)
,
where 11 ( ) = (1 + ) 0 − 0−111 and 12 ( ) = 0. The derivatives with
respect to 2 can be readily obtained as
P ( )
2 =
(1 + )P ( )P
=1 1
− () (  )+12
and
P ( )
2 =
P ( )P
=1 1
for each   = 1 2 · · · , where
 (  ) = X ³2001+1 − 1+20 11´+(1− )X ³1+20 11 − 2001+1 ´ .
¤
Proof of Corollary 3 The partial derivative vector is obtained as ∇B ( ), where 3 +
27+6 =  and 2+5 =  by construction and by letting  ≡ 51−24 = (2 − 1)12.
Then the result follows immediately from the result above using Theorem 7.5 of Hoeﬀding
(1948). Note that 1 4  0 since it is assumed that    (∗)  1 −  for some  ∈ (0 1),
and thus   0 for all  = 1 2 · · ·  7. ¤
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